The Principle of Double Effect
Sometimes, even good actions have bad consequences. We might make a decision which is foreseen to have some good effects and some bad effects (hence “double effect”). Let’s see what the Catechism has to say on this issue:
a. An effect can be tolerated without being willed by its agent; for instance, a mother’s exhaustion from tending her sick child. A bad effect is not imputable if it was not willed either as an end or as a means of an action, e.g., a death a person incurs in aiding someone in danger. (1)
In other words, sometimes you may realize that undesirable consequences will ensue from an action: speaking the truth of the faith will make some people uncomfortable, diving on a live grenade to save your companions will get you killed, and an operation to remove a cancerous uterus will lead to infertility.
However, it’s still possible to morally make such a choice, provided:
a. the action itself is not intrinsically evil,
b. the undesirable consequences are not willed as a means or an end,
c. the good consequences seem (as far as one can tell) to outweigh the bad consequences,
d. there doesn’t seem to be a better, morally permissible alternative.
The important thing to remember is that the principle of double effect doesn’t justify evil actions. All four conditions must be present for the act to be acceptable. (2)
So, what’s the basic difference between consequentialism and the principle of double effect? Very simply, the principle of double effect says: “Do something good with the hope that in the long run there will be more good consequences than bad consequences.”
a. The principle of double effect starts out with a concrete good and then hopes for the possible future good. It’s like taking a hundred dollars and putting it in the bank with the hope that it will generate interest and make you even more money.
b. Consequentialism, on the contrary, says: “Do something evil with the hope that in the long run there will be more good consequences than bad consequences.”
i. Consequentialism starts out with destroying a concrete good and then hopes for the possible future good. It is like taking a hundred dollars and ripping it to pieces with the hope that it will make you even more money. Obviously, that doesn’t make much sense, which is why consequentialism has consistently been rejected by Catholic teaching.
Levels of Cooperation (3)
a. It’s also important to be aware of the different levels of cooperation. Sometimes we may be involved in an evil action which is mainly performed by somebody else. How do we know if that’s okay? Well, there are three levels of cooperation, two of which are morally impermissible, and one of which is legitimate:
b. Formal cooperation: This is when lend your help to an intrinsically evil action because you want the act accomplished. For instance, a young man driving his girlfriend to the abortion clinic because he desires to have the pregnancy terminated, or a bank manager secretly in league with a robber who tells the latter the combination to the safe because the manager desires to have the bank robbed. Both these men are guilty of wrongdoing, since they want the evil that’s being committed.
c. In contrast to formal cooperation is material cooperation, which is where you become consciously involved in an action, even though you don’t want that action performed. There are two sub-headings under material cooperation:
d. Proximate material cooperation: here you’re very intimately connected to the evil that’s being done. So, suppose you work at the checkout counter in a pornography store. Or maybe you’re a hospital nurse assigned to assist at an abortion and your task is to hand the doctor the knife when he asks for it.
e. Now, it may be that you don’t like men objectifying women, or you don’t want the doctor to kill the baby. You’re just doing your job. Nonetheless, you are too close to the act, too involved, and you have become guilty by association. Consequently, proximate material cooperation in an evil act is not morally permissible.
f. Remote material cooperation: you are distantly connected to the evil that is being done. You eat at McDonalds, drink Starbucks coffee, purchase popular music, and pay your taxes, and you realize that some of that money probably goes to Planned Parenthood, which supports and provides abortion and contraception. In these cases, although you’re somehow involved in the evil that is being done, you’re far enough from it that you don’t incur any guilt.
g. Sometimes it’s hard to tell whether an act is proximate or remote to evil. How involved is too involved? In such cases, pray, seek out the counsel of wise and holy persons, and trust in God. Generally, though, there are a lot more recommendations which favor avoiding what might be too proximate to sin: better safe than sorry, and when in doubt go without.
(1) #1737.
(2) For example, voting for the more pro-choice candidate in an election may not go against the first two conditions, but in my opinion it just about always goes against the third. It is hard to think up what consequences could outweigh the evil of supporting the ongoing slaughter of millions of innocent children.
(3) C.f., Evangelium vitae, #74